| DESCRIPTION OF ACTION |
|---|
| Contact was first made with enemy forces about 1200, zone +10 time at an altitude of 1500
feet and a distance of approximately 30 miles, bearing 320 from the attacking group. At the time
of initial contact the enemy appeared to be on course 270° and in the subsequent approach their
course changed from 270° to 000° and before dropping point was reached had been reversed
to 180°. These changes in course enabled the carriers to keep the attacking torpedo planes
continuously on their quarter necessitating a long period in which attacking planes were under
A.A. fire from surface ships and attack by fighters. The maneuvering mentioned does not strictly
apply to all types of ships in the task force but applies particularly to the carriers, other
ships of the task force maneuvered independently and became widely separated. |
| Torpedo Squadron Six was the first to deliver its attack, attacking about 1220, and was subjected
to the concentrated fire of all types of surface ships and numerous fighters of the "0" type. The
torpedo attack had been completed and the remaining planes were clear of all screening vessels when
the first bomb from the dive bombers hit the carriers of the task force. The loss of such a large
number of torpedo planes (TEN) is attributed to the lack of coordination of fighter escort, as
well as attack by numerous enemy fighters, approximately 25. It is believed few, if any, planes
were lost due to A.A. fire. Fighters attacked repeatedly but would not press home an attack in the
face of accurate fire from the free gunners who were using the twin mount .30 cal. gun. On the
whole, A.A. fire from surface ships was close but not effective and it is believed that A.A.
bursts were used as a "fighter director" in that they appeared to "point out" the approximate
position of attacking planes to their fighter patrol in this manner. |
| Approach to dropping positions and retirement after dropping were such that no accurate
summary can be made of the individual directions of approach and withdrawal. The initial part
of the approach from time of sighting up to the time when fighters attacked and A.A. fire
became intense is shown below. |
 |
| The turns were so timed that it was impossible to obtain an advantageous point from which to
drop. Indication of ships positions is only approximate and incomplete as this squadron
concentrated on the carrier indicated and accurate plotting of ships position was impossible
due to the widely spread positions and distraction caused by fighters and A.A. fire. Retirement
and return to the carrier were made by single plane units. |
| It is the belief of the writer that all pilots and men of this squadron, who participated in
the attack described, should be very highly commended for their courageous action. Those pilots
and men set an example of moral courage and devotion to duty that will be difficult to equal
anywhere in the service. The attack was pressed home in the face of intense light and heavy
calibre A.A. fire and fighter aircraft opposition of the Japanese "Zero" type. The Japanese
fighter planes were not only superior in maneuverability and fire power but outnumbered our
fourteen TBD-1 aircraft in the ratio of 2 to 1. It is not the desire of the writer to call
attention to the action of any one individual but it is his sincere wish that some recognition
be given those who paid with their lives for a magnificent victory. |